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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS DALE JONES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050948-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's revocation of his probation following 
a conviction for criminal non-support, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-7-201(3) (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue: Is defendant entitled to relief when he has not cited to any authority 
that could grant relief? 
Standard of Review: No standard of review applies. Utah's appellate courts 
are "resolute in [their] refusal to take up constitutional issues which have not been 
properly preserved, framed and briefed." Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT13,114, 
122 P.3d 506, rev'd on other grounds, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (2006). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statute and rule are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West 2004); 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 22. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In June, 2004, defendant was charged with criminal nonsupport, a third 
degree felony. Rl. He entered a plea of no contest one month later. R10-38,40. The 
trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of zero to five years in prison. 
R49. However, the court suspended that sentence and placed defendant on 
probation for 36 months. Id. The court also ordered defendant to pay $27,534.33 in 
restitution, to maintain full-time verifiable employment, to receive a mental health 
evaluation, to keep his probation officer apprised of his place of residence, and to 
abide by the written agreement that defendant would enter into with Adult 
Probation and Parole (AP&P). R52-53. 
Approximately six months after it granted defendant's probation, the court 
received an affidavit from defendant's probation office reporting numerous 
probation violations. R59-60. The court held a hearing for an Order to Show Cause 
in May, 2005. R68-70. It revoked and restarted defendant's probation. R71-73. In 
August, defendant's probation officer filed another affidavit alleging further 
violations. R77-78. After defendant failed to attend his hearing on this second 
2 
Order to Show Cause, the court issued a bench warrant. R83-84. One week later, 
defendant requested a hearing for a Voluntary Appearance on his Bench Warrant. 
R87-88. The court notified defendant of the hearing scheduled for September 19, 
2005. R89-90. However, defendant failed to appear at the hearing. R92. 
Nevertheless, the trial court revoked defendant's probation, and committed 
defendant to prison for an indeterminate term of zero to five years. R91,94. 
Defendant timely appealed. R104. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
"[S]he did not have enough money to pay for their school clothes/' 
For four years, defendant knowingly failed to honor his divorce decree and 
his parental obligations. Under the terms of his divorce decree, he was to support 
his four children by sending his ex-wife, Debra Jewkes, $250 per child per month, 
totaling $1,000 per month. R5, 37. Ms. Jewkes estimated that defendant owed 
approximately $28,500 in past-due support. R5. This total did not include medical 
bills for the children, for which defendant was partially liable. R5. Ms. Jewkes 
indicated that defendant had paid support only when it was garnished from his 
wages. R5. She also reported that "she had her utilities shut off, had to borrow 
money from her family, and struggled to provide the basic needs of her children 
and provide them with food/7 R4. "She stated that she did not have enough money 
to pay for their school clothes/7 R4. 
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The State charged defendant with criminal non-support, alleging that 
defendant had knowingly failed to pay child support when "any one of [his 
children] was in needy circumstances/' R2. Defendant entered a plea of no contest. 
R10-38,40. The court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of zero to five 
years in prison, but suspended the sentence and placed him on probation. R40,48-
49. The probation order had several conditions. Defendant was required to comply 
with his written agreement with AP&P,1 maintain a personal residence and apprise 
his probation officer of his address, receive a mental health evaluation and any 
treatment recommended by that evaluation, maintain full-time employment, pay 
$27,534.33 in restitution, and continue the support payments for his three minor 
children. R52-53. 
"I'm tired of playing this game/7 
In March, 2005, defendant's probation officer, Agent David Lowry, filed an 
affidavit in support of an Order to Show Cause, alleging that defendant had: (1) 
"absconded in avoiding contact with AP&P" and not provided his address; (2) 
failed to enter into a mental health program; (3) failed to pay his supervision fees, as 
required by his written probation agreement with AP&P; and (4) failed to report to 
1
 The Probation Agreement is not included in the record, but is referred to in 
subsequent affidavits as requiring defendant to report to his probation officer 
regularly and pay supervision fees. See R59, 77. 
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AP&P from October, 2004 to March, 2005, all in violation of the agreement. R59. 
The trial court held a hearing on an Order to Show Cause. R62-63, 68-70. 
Defendant appeared, denied the allegations, and requested appointed counsel. 
After the court found that defendant was not indigent and denied appointed 
counsel, it offered to continue the hearing. R69. Defendant declined and proceeded 
pro se. Id. 
After hearing testimony from both Agent Lowry and defendant, the court 
found that defendant had violated his probation. R69. It revoked his probation, but 
restarted it under the same terms, adding the requirement that defendant personally 
report to AP&P on specific dates: June 1, July 1, August 1, September 1, and October 
3. R69,71-73. The court later recalled that it had tried to accommodate defendant's 
schedule:"We even went to the point of finding out what day of the week each first 
of the month was for six months so that we could see if there was a conflict/7 T. at 
14.3 The court scheduled a review of defendant's probation for October 31. The 
court made a note to itself to " [p]ut him in jail or prison on his next violation i.e. Oct 
A transcript of this hearing is not included in the record. Thus, the facts of 
this hearing are gleaned from the minute entry. See R68-70. 
3
 The transcript of the September 19 hearing is not assigned a record number. 
Consequently, the State will refer to it as T. 
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31st - And then terminate his probation/' See Post-itnote on Judge's Notes 5/9/054; 
see also Judge's Notes 5/9/05 at 3 ("Appearance on Oct 31st Send him to prison -"). 
Three months later, Agent Lowry filed another affidavit in support of an 
Order to Show Cause, in which he alleged that defendant had failed to provide 
proof of mental health treatment, failed to pay his supervision fees, and failed to 
report to AP&P in June, July and August. R77. Defendant was personally served 
with notice of the hearing, which was scheduled for August 29. R81. However, the 
morning of the hearing, defendant called Agent Lowry and told him that he would 
not be attending.5 R84. When asked why he could not come, defendant "responded 
that Mr. Lowry should make up a reason." R83. He later told Agent Lowry that he 
could not find a ride and was "tired of playing this game." R83. The trial court 
continued the hearing and issued a bench warrant for defendant's arrest. R83. 
About a week later, defendant filed a Request for Hearing for Voluntary 
Appearance on a Bench Warrant, in which he requested a hearing "as soon as 
possible." R88. On September 14, the court served defense counsel with notice of 
the hearing. 
4
 The trial court's notes, while included in the record, are not numbered. 
5
 The transcript for this telephonic hearing is not in the record. Details of the 
hearing are drawn from the minute entry. See R83-84. 
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"Where is Mr. Jones?" 
The court convened for defendant's hearing at 10:00 a.m. on Monday, 
September 19. R91-92. The court began by asking defense counsel, "Where is Mr. 
Jones?" T.4. Defense counsel reported that she had spoken with defendant on 
Friday, and he had indicated "he would be here." T. 4. The court asked Agent 
Lowry if he had heard from defendant, to which Agent Lowry responded, "I have 
not." T. 4. The court noted, "Well, he didn't make it to his last hearing either. 
That's why I issued the warrant for his arrest." T. 4. The court asked the prosecutor 
if he was ready to proceed, and indicated that it would find that defendant had 
voluntarily absented himself. T. 4. The prosecutor noted that defendant had 
requested this hearing, and that the State was ready to proceed. T. 5. He 
recommended a prison sentence, which he indicated would be "the same regardless 
of whether [defendant was] [t]here or not." T. 5. 
The court addressed defense counsel, noting that defendant was "choosing 
not to be here. This is his second hearing he's chosen not to make it for." T. 5. 
Defense counsel stated that "we would prefer not to proceed now," but if the court 
chose to proceed, she would respond. T. 5. 
The prosecutor called Agent Lowry, who testified that he had not received 
evidence from defendant proving that defendant had obtained his mental health 
evaluation by June 1. T. 6. Although defendant had received a "modified" 
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evaluation, it was not the one AP&P required. T. 6. Defendant had since been 
informed that he needed a more complete evaluation, but he had not obtained one. 
T. 6-7. Defendant had failed to report in person to AP&P on June 1, July 1, or 
August 1. T. 7. Although defendant had called and left a message on Agent 
Lowry's answering machine, defendant did not report to AP&P on June 1. T. 7. 
Agent Lowry contacted defendant through his work and asked him to report the 
next day, but defendant "just never showed up/ ' T. 7. Agent Lowry finally made 
contact with defendant by telephone on June 17, and told him that he would need to 
report in on the following Monday, "and I would wait for him if he had to be late." 
T. 7. Nevertheless, defendant failed to report that day. T. 7. 
In July, Agent Lowry tried to have defendant's case transferred to American 
Fork, which was closer to the motel at which defendant stayed. T. 7. However, the 
transfer was cancelled when defendant failed to report to the American Fork office. 
T. 7-8. Defendant did not report to AP&P in July or August. T. 8. He also failed to 
pay his supervisory fees. T. 8-9. 
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited that defendant had taken an 
anger management class, but that it was not the complete evaluation that AP&P had 
required. T. 9. Agent Lowry admitted that defendant had left messages on his 
machine, calling early in the morning or late at night, but would not make any more 
effort to contact Agent Lowry. T. 9-10. Agent Lowry informed the court that July 1 
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was normally his day off, but he "came in and worked that day just in case 
[defendant] came in." T. 10. However, defendant did not arrive. T. 10. Agent 
Lowry confirmed that he had spoken with Ms. Jewkes, defendant's ex-wife, and that 
she appreciated the support payments that had been arriving. T. 11. Apparently, 
"the garnishment ha[d] been going as planned over the past several months." T. 11. 
The prosecutor recommended prison time because defendant was "playing a 
game with us on these little minor things that he doesn't want to comply with." T. 
12. Defense counsel admitted that defendant's was a "difficult situation" and that 
there was "very little excuse for [defendant] not complying to the letter as this court 
directed him." T. 12. However, she asked the court to consider that defendant 
would not be making money while incarcerated, leaving his children without the 
support they had been receiving. T. 12. She indicated that defendant "is wary of 
authority and may question the directives that he's given," and asked the court to 
give him "additional time to bring himself into compliance" with the court's order. 
T.13. 
The court explained that defendant "likes to play the victim." T. 14. It 
indicated that at the May, 2005 hearing it had "made it absolutely crystal clear that 
[defendant] was to show up in person on the first of every month." T. 14. The court 
noted that in order to get a transfer to a closer AP&P office, "[aJU [defendant] had to 
do was show up." T. 14. It explained that for his previous probation violations it 
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"gave him no punishment at the last hearing. I told him it was his last chance. He 
gets no additional chances/7 T. 15. The court treated his early morning phone 
messages as "an attempt to try to get out of appearing/7 and recognized that Agent 
Lowry had been willing to accommodate defendant's schedule. T. 15. The court 
found that defendant had not made "any effort to comply at all77 with paying his 
supervision fees. T. 16. 
The court considered his failure to appear as an indication that the court 
needed to "get his attention to let him know we are actually serious about this [] 
thing.77 T. 16. It continued, "when someone simply fails to appear, and this is the 
second time he7s failed to appear, I have no choice in my mind but to let him know 
that we are serio us about this.77 T. 16. The court revoked defendants probation and 
ordered his commitment to the Utah State Prison. T. 16-17. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's reliance on Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 and State v. 
Wanosik is misplaced, as they govern sentencing hearings following a criminal 
conviction. "Probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature,77 State v. Hudecek, 
965 P.2d 1069,1071 (Utah App 1998), and are governed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(12). Therefor^ the heightened due process requirements of Rule 22 and Wanosik 
are not applicable. Defendant is entitled only to limited due process rights. 
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However, defendant has not alleged any violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) 
or due process. Therefore, this Court should not address the issue. 
Even if Wanosik applied to probation revocation proceedings, the trial court 
made a "reasonable inquiry" into defendant's location, and determined from the 
totality of the circumstances that defendant's absence was voluntary. Defendant, 
who had notice of the hearing, repeatedly failed to report to his probation officer, 
had voluntarily missed his previous probation revocation hearing, and had 
expressed his disinterest in the probation process generally. Thus, the trial court did 
not err by questioning defense counsel and defendant's probation officer about 
defendant's absence, and then finding that defendant had voluntarily absented 
himself. 
ARGUMENT 
WANOSIK DOES NOT GOVERN PROBATION REVOCATION 
PROCEEDINGS AND DEFENDANT HAS NOT ALLEGED ANY 
OTHER GROUNDS FOR RELIEF 
Defendant claims that the trial court violated Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 22 and the requirements of State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 43, 79 P.3d 937, by 
revoking his probation in absentia. Aplt. Br. at 5-9. Because "there could have been 
a legitimate and justifiable excuse or reason explaining [defendant's] non-
appearance/7 he argues, the trial court was obligated to conduct an inquiry into his 
absence before proceeding with the hearing. Aplt. Br. at 6. Defendant's argument is 
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misplaced because Rule 22 and Wanosik do not apply to probation revocation 
proceedings. 
A. Trial courts are required to make a reasonable inquiry 
regarding a defendant's absence from a sentencing hearing. 
In a sentencing hearing, a trial court may not automatically presume a 
voluntary waiver unless it makes a "reasonable inquiry" as to why defendant is not 
present. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, % 24. This duty is imposed upon the sentencing court 
because "defendants have the right to be present at all stages of the criminal 
proceedings against them and [] it is the burden of the prosecution to show that an 
absent defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived that right before 
sentencing in absentia can proceed." Id. at f 12 (citations omitted). Moreover, Rule 
22, which governs sentencing hearings, imposes an "affirmative duty to provide 
both an opportunity to address the court and present information relevant to 
sentencing before imposing sentence." Id. at f^ 25. 
However, defendant was present at his sentencing hearing. SeeR49. At issue 
here is his probation revocation hearing. Defendant has cited no authority, and the 
State can find none, that extends the requirements of Rule 22 or Wanosik to 
revocation hearings. To the contrary, probation revocation hearings are governed 
by different standards and procedures. 
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B. Probationers have fewer due process rights at a revocation 
hearing than they have at sentencing. 
Utah courts, when dealing "with the question of revocation of probation/7 
have long indicated that "when a person has been found guilty of an offense and 
sentenced, he is in quite a different status than he is before conviction." Velasquez v. 
Pratt, 443 P.2d 1020,1021 (Utah 1968). A probation revocation hearing is "not a 
criminal prosecution," State v. Bonza, 150 P.2d 970, 972 (Utah 1944), but is "civil in 
nature." State v. Hudecek, 965 P.2d 1069,1071 (Utah App. 1998). "Such proceedings 
are 'entirely independent of any related criminal proceeding/" Id. (quoting Petersen 
v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148,1154 (Utah 1995)). 
When a convicted defendant enters into a probation agreement, he enters into 
"essentially a contract with the court: the court agrees to stay part or all of the 
statutory sentence, and the probationer in turn agrees to perform or abstain from 
performing certain acts." State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270,278 (Utah App. 1990). Like a 
parole revocation proceeding, "[d]ifferent burdens of proof and different procedural 
rules apply." Petersen, 907 P.2d at 1154. 
Probation revocation hearings are not governed by Rule 22. Rather, their 
procedure is laid out by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (addendum A). Defendant 
does not acknowledge this distinction. See Br. Aplt. at 5. Consequently, he requests 
relief under case law and court rules governing sentencing hearings. See Br. Aplt. at 
13 
5-10. However, revocation hearings, which are civil in nature, do not have the same 
procedural protections as sentencing, which is a critical phase of a criminal 
prosecution. See State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 854-55 (Utah 1994) ("Sentencing is a 
part of a criminal proceeding. Thus, a defendant is entitled to due process 
protections during sentencing to prevent procedural unfairness/') (citation omitted). 
The due process afforded a defendant during critical phases of a criminal 
prosecution is substantially greater than that provided during a civil revocation 
proceeding. 
Probationers are entitled to due process. However, the process they are 
entitled to is limited. The United States Supreme Court established the minimum 
requirements of parole revocation hearings in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 
(1972). These requirements were extended to probation revocations in Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (holding that "a probationer, like a parolee, is 
entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions 
specified in Morrissey"). 
The Court began its analysis "with the proposition that the revocation of 
parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a 
defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations/7 Morrissey, 
408 U.S. at 480 (citation omitted). The Court then turned "to the question whether 
the requirements of due process in general apply to parole revocations." Id. The 
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Court determined that the limited liberty provided by parole was 'Valuable and 
must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment/' Id. at 482. 
But it also noted that "[o]nce it is determined that due process applies, the question 
remains what process is due." Id. At 481. The Supreme Court determined that the 
termination of parole "calls for some orderly process, however informal." Id. at 482. 
It then listed the minimum requirements of due process in revocation hearings: 
They include (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) 
disclosure to the parolee of the evidence against him; (c) opportunity to 
be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary 
evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses 
(unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not 
allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body. . . ; 
and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied 
on and reasons for revoking the parole. 
Id. at 489. These limited due process rights have been codified in Utah Code Ann. § 
76-18-1(12) (West 2004). See State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988) ("[T]he 
power to revoke probation must be exercised within legislatively established 
limits."); State v. Grate, 947 R2d 1161, 1167 (Utah App. 1997) ("[A] court's 
jurisdiction over probation revocation proceedings is governed by statute."). A trial 
court's failure to provide these procedures is grounds for reversal. See State v. 
Gastelum-Loipez, 2001 UT App 348, \ 1 (unpublished) ("The failure to follow the 
procedures outlined in section 77-18-1 (12)(b) - (c) warrants reversal.") (attached at 
Addendum B). 
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C. This Court should not address an issue that defendant has not 
raised in his opening brief. 
Defendant has not argued that the trial court denied him any of the due 
process rights he was entitled to at a probation revocation hearing. He has also not 
asked this Court to consider whether WanosiVs "reasonable inquiry" requirement 
should be extended to probation revocation hearings. He has not cited Morrissey or 
Gagnon or claimed that the proceeding in absentia violated due process. In short, he 
has alleged no basis for this Court to grant him relief. As such, this Court should 
not consider the issue. Utah appellate courts are "resolute in [their] refusal to take 
up constitutional issues which have not been properly preserved, framed and 
briefed." Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT13,114,122 P.3d 506, rev'd on other grounds 
by 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006). See also State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, f 19,122 P.3d 566 
(refusing to address plain error argument raised in reply brief because a defendant 
must "articulate the justification for review in [his] opening brief/7); State v. Reyes, 
2002 UT 13, If 5,40 P.3d 630 (holding that "by failing to address on appeal" an issue 
the Court could consider, the defendant had "waived consideration of that issue"). 
D. In any case, the trial court made a reasonable inquiry and 
determined, from the totality of the circumstances, that 
defendant voluntarily absented himself. 
Even if Wanosik applied to this case, the trial court did not simply presume 
that defendant was voluntarily absent, as defendant contends. Br. Aplt. at 9-10. 
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" [T]he question of voluntariness is highly f act-dependent" and "is tied to the totality 
of the circumstances in particular cases." Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, % 15. Moreover, 
"[t]rial courts are well-positioned to assess what questions need to be asked and 
answered before voluntariness can be properly inferred." Id. at f 15. Defendant has 
not suggested to this Court what would have constituted a "reasonable inquiry" 
into defendant's whereabouts, but broadly asserts that the court conducted none. 
See Br. Aplt. at 9-10. However, the record reveals that the trial court made a brief, 
but reasonable inquiry into the reason for defendant's absence, and inferred from 
the totality of the circumstances that he voluntarily absented himself. 
The court was aware that defendant had voluntarily absented himself from 
his August 29 hearing because he was "tired of playing this game." R83. On 
September 19, defendant did not arrive at the hearing that he had specifically 
requested. See R87-88. The trial court inquired whether defense counsel or 
defendant's probation officer had been in contact with defendant. T. 4. They 
answered that they did not know defendant's location. T. 4. The trial court, which 
is "well-positioned" to determine how deep an inquiry is required, made a brief but 
reasonable inquiry and concluded that it had sufficient information to properly infer 
that defendant's absence was voluntary. 
Considering the totality of defendant's behavior over the previous year, and 
the responses from defense counsel and defendant's probation officer, the trial court 
17 
could reasonably infer that defendant had voluntarily absented himself. Defendant 
had failed to report in person to AP&P from October, 2004 through March, 2005, 
when the court admonished him to abide by the probation agreement R59, R68-70. 
Even after the trial court specifically ordered defendant to report to AP&P on 
specific days in June, July, August, September and October, defendant failed to 
report. R69, 71-73. Defendant's voluntary absence at the August 29 hearing, 
combined with his consistent failure to report in person to AP&P for more than nine 
months of probation, suggests that defendant was not taking his situation seriously. 
See T. 16. Although he had told defense counsel that he would attend, he failed to 
appear, and failed to notify his defense counsel as to why he could or would not 
appear. The trial court reasonably determined that defendant's absence was a result 
of his own choice. Viewing his absence from the totality of the circumstances, the 
trial court correctly found that defendant had voluntarily absented himself from his 
revocation hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests this Court to affirm the trial court's order 
revoking defendant's probation. 
18 
Respectfully submitted August _!__, 2006 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Erin Riley 
Assistant Attorney Generc 
Counsel for Appellee 
19 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on August Z-, 2006,1 served two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, Douglas Dale Jones, by mailing them, 
postage prepaid, to his counsel of record as follows: 
Randall C. Allen 
Barnes & Allen, LLP 
Depot Plaza 
415 N. Main, Suite 303 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
20 
Addenda 
Addendum A 
UT ST § 77-18-1 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-18-1 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 18. THE JUDGMENT 
§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation— 
Supervision—Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—Terms and 
conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or extension—Hearings— 
Electronic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with 
a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided 
in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in 
abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of 
any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the 
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may 
place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except 
in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private 
organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the 
sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation 
standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall 
be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
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(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of 
services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the 
Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for 
review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to 
implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications 
to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3) (a) and other criteria as 
they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact 
report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to 
supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or 
infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the probation 
of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for 
a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence 
investigation report from the department or information from other sources about 
the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement 
according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the 
crime on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of 
pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding 
the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with 
Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 7 6-3-404, are 
protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing 
as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the 
defendant's attoi~ney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the 
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any 
alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been 
resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought 
to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional 
ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the 
department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the 
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court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation 
report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require 
that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed 
on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated 
by the department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to 
which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic 
monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the 
compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, 
a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense 
if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational 
certificate prior to being placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed 
in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
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(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by 
Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 
64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with 
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation 
and any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection 
(10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court 
or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or 
infractions. 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under 
Subsection (10) (a) (i) , there remains an unpaid balance upon the account 
receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction 
of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited 
purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry 
of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately 
transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt 
Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, 
or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why 
his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court. 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt 
Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when 
termination of supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete 
report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having 
been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation 
does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the 
probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning 
revocation of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing. 
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(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation 
report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of 
probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a 
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding 
that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted 
to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized 
probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe 
that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be 
served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and 
an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or 
extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and 
shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be 
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if 
he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the 
affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting 
attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations 
are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the 
defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and 
present evidence. 
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, 
the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the 
entire probation term commence anew. 
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(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence 
previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the 
Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State 
Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the 
court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state 
hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for 
treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63- 2-403 
and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a 
presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing 
pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the presentence 
investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the 
department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the 
offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the 
subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the 
disclosure £o the victim shall include only information relating to statements or 
materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime including 
statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on the victim or the 
victim's household. 
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation 
under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 7 6- 3-406 
and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement, 
including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department 
in accordance with Subsection (16). 
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(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may 
order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of 
electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order of the 
court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law 
enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through 
electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of 
Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the 
defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the 
defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to 
the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic 
monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the 
court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this 
section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 2; Laws 1982, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1983, 
c. 47, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 68, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 85, § 2; Laws 1984, c. 20, § 
1; Laws 1985, c. 212, § 17; Laws 1985, c. 229, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 114, § 1; 
Laws 1989, c. 226, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 134, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 66, § 5; Laws 
1991, c. 206, § 6; Laws 1992, c. 14, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 82, § 7; Laws 1993, c. 
220, § 3; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 24; Laws 1994, c. 198, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 230, § 1; 
Laws 1995, c. 20, § 146, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 117, § 2, eff. May 1, 
1995; Laws 1995, c. 184, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 3, eff. May 
1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 337, § 11, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 352, § 6, eff. 
May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 103, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 390, § 
2, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 94, § 10, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 
279, § 8, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 287, § 7, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2001, 
c. 137, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 7, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 
2002, 5th Sp. Sess., c. 8, § 137, eff. Sept. 8, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 290, § 3, 
eff. May 5, 2003. 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
-f RULE 22. SENTENCE, JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for imposing 
sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may 
continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present 
any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The 
prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of 
sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be 
sentenced in defendants absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may 
be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment 
of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal 
shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting forth the sentence. The 
officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison 
and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in accordance with Title 77, 
Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing 
order. 
[Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.] 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Pleas in abeyance agreement, see §§ 77-2a-2 and 77-2a-3. 
Postconviction Remedies Act, application, see § 78-35a-102. 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Liberado GASTELUM-LOPEZ, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 20000829-CA. 
Nov. 16,2001. 
Linda M. Jones and James A. Valdez, Salt Lake 
City, for appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Buckner, Salt Lake 
City, for appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD, DAVIS, and THORNE, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
DAVIS, Judge. 
*1 Gastelum-Lopez argues that the court violated 
his rights under the probation revocation statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (Supp .1997), m l 
and his right to due process.1^2 The failure to 
follow the procedures outlined in section 
77-18-1 (12)(b)-(c) warrants reversal. 
FN1. We utilize the 1997 version of the 
statute because it was the law when 
Gastelum-Lopez was sentenced. See Smith 
v. Cook, 803 P .2d 788, 792-93 (Utah 
1990). 
FN2. Due to our disposition on 
Gastelum-Lopez's procedural statutory 
claim, we do not reach his constitutional 
arguments or his separate claim that he had 
a statutory right to appointed counsel. 
Although bench probation is specifically authorized 
by section 77-18-l(2)(a)(ii), there is no provision 
excepting bench probation from compliance with 
the requirements of section 77-18-l(12)(b). Section 
77-18-1(12)(b)(i) provides that to commence a 
revocation proceeding, there must be an affidavit 
filed alleging particular facts that, if proven, would 
constitute a violation. According to the statute, the 
court must then make a preliminary probable cause 
determination, and if the court finds there is 
probable cause to believe there has been a violation, 
it "shall cause to be served on the defendant a 
warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and 
an order to show cause why his probation should 
not be revoked." Id § 77-18-l(12)(b)(ii); see also 
State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997) (stating the proper way to initiate a 
probation revocation proceeding is to issue an order 
to show cause). Under section 77-18-l(12)(c), the 
show cause order "shall" specify the time and the 
place for the hearing, "shall" give the probationer at 
least five days advance notice of the hearing, "shall" 
inform the probationer of a right to counsel and to 
appointed counsel if indigent, and "shall" inform 
the probationer of the right to present evidence. 
These procedures were not followed, and on this 
record we cannot say Gastelum-Lopez waived these 
rights. Cf State v. Martin, 1999 UT App 62, 1fl[ 
14-16, 976 P.2d 1224 (upholding trial court's 
determination that probationer had waived rights 
provided by section 77-18-l(12)(b) (e)). Therefore, 
it was reversible error for the court to disregard the 
mandatory language of the statute. See State v. 
Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1996) (failing to 
follow statute requiring mandatory written findings 
for sentence enhancement was plain error requiring 
reversal); Martin, 1999 UT App 62 at f 9 
(implying that if probationer does not waive the 
procedural protections of section 77-18-l(12)(b)-(e) 
, the procedures "must be followed"). 
Based on the court's failure to comply with the 
mandatory language of section 77-18-l(12)(b)-(c), 
our confidence in the outcome is sufficiently 
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undermined that we must reverse the order revoking 
Gastelum-Lopez's probation. 
However, we reject Gastelum-Lopez's contention 
that he is now entitled to outright release because 
the three year probation period has expired. This 
case does not present the potential for placing a 
probationer in a perpetual state of limbo, expecting 
that his probation has terminated only to be subject 
to a later revocation, as was the situation in Smith v. 
Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990). Here, 
Gastelum-Lopez had no reasonable expectation that 
his probation had terminated because a revocation 
hearing was held before the probation period 
terminated, he admitted a violation, and he was 
remanded to custody to serve the balance of his 
sentence. Thus, we agree with the State that the 
revocation proceeding, although defective, did toll 
the probationary period, see State v. Call, 1999 UT 
41, If 11, 980 P.2d 201, and we remand for further 
proceedings consistent with section 
77-18-l(12)(b)-(c). 
*2 Reversed and remanded. 
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Presiding J. and 
WILLIAM A. THORNE, JR., J., concur. 
UtahApp.,2001. 
State v. Gastelum-Lopez 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2001 WL 1476573 (Utah 
App.), 2001 UT App 348 
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